

25X1B4d

[REDACTED] - WHERE NOW? - RECONSIDERED

[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

25X1A9a

25X1A9a

25X1A9a

25X1B4d

As [REDACTED] lucidly demonstrates, [REDACTED] have been of great value in estimating the production of military end items. It is therefore reasonable to ask "where now?" - Does [REDACTED] ^{25X1B4d} analysis possess untapped potential as an indicator of the allocation of the Soviet effort between civilian and military production and between producer and consumer goods?

It would indeed be of much use to the intelligence community to have at its disposal a technique capable of indicating not only the level of output of particular military and civilian products, but also a more comprehensive guide to the allocation of effort between sectors of the economy. The applicability of this technique to these problems is doubtful and requires careful evaluation.

Applicability of [REDACTED] ^{25X1B4d} to General Economic Intelligence Problems

Assuming that [REDACTED] ^{25X1B4d} from selected military end items such as tanks and aircraft provides [REDACTED] 25X1B4d military production, are there parallel items that can be counted by [REDACTED] 25X1B4d analysis in order to indicate the extent to which Soviet production effort is allocated to civilian production or to consumer as against producer goods? In its current effort to overtake the West in per capita production the USSR is emphasizing the production of meat, milk, and butter. Increased attention is also being given to the production of clothing and to the provision of more adequate housing. Even in the

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Soviet economy the greater part of the national product consists of goods and services for the population. Is it seriously proposed to measure domestic production of these products by means of [REDACTED] 25X1B4d

25X1B4d [REDACTED]

25X1B4d

25X1B4d [REDACTED] has had considerable success in gauging the output of military end items such as tanks and aircraft, whose end use is readily identifiable, and which are assembled in a relatively small number of plants. [REDACTED] 25X1B4d analysis may also assist in the estimate of current output of such producer goods as trucks, tractors, and construction equipment, but it is impossible to tell from the nature of many manufactured products whether they will be allocated to direct military purposes, to the production of other producer goods, or to the production of food, clothing, and housing. [REDACTED] 25X1B4d analysis in itself is not capable of disclosing the end use to which many industrial products will be put, and is therefore not an adequate indicator of changes in economic policy.

What, for example, is the objective of the current Soviet effort to increase the production of consumer goods, to shorten the work week, and to raise minimum wages? Is it the purpose of these moves to improve the welfare of the consumer or is it intended to increase incentives and thereby to raise the productivity of workers in heavy industry?

Analyzed in conjunction with other evidence, [REDACTED] 25X1B4d data may help to answer questions of this type. Clearly, [REDACTED] analysis in itself cannot explain directly the reasons for or even the nature of broad 25X1B4d changes in economic policy which transcend the production of particular

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commodities - changes for example, in the emphasis upon an entire sector of the economy, either as the producer or consumer of national product.

Collection Problems

Furthermore, the collection of [REDACTED] ^{25X1B4d/} from battle^{the} field is not comparable to the requirement for the [REDACTED] 25X1B4d

25X1B4d [REDACTED] Not only would the list of products have to be extensive, but also many products are made in a great number of factories, each of which has its own [REDACTED] 25X1B4d independent of that of other factories. It would therefore be very difficult, if not impossible to establish a collection system to sample adequately all or even the major producers of the targetted items. To be effective, the shopping list would have to be compiled not on the basis of the end product, since producers go in and out of production of particular items, but on the total array of Soviet factories capable of producing significant quantities of end products. Such a list would include thousands of installations, quite beyond the scope of any practical collection project. At best [REDACTED] ^{25X1B4d} could give reasonable estimates of outputs of those factories from which it could 25X1B4d [REDACTED] not the total production of an entire economic sector.

If, in addition, [REDACTED] 25X1B4d outside of the Soviet Union, considerable bias may be introduced by the 25X1B4d fact that certain producers may be delegated the task of production for export. It is possible that production for export may continue as a

matter of national policy, even when production for domestic consumption in other plants has been significantly modified.

Finally, even if the acquisition, processing, and analysis of [REDACTED] 25X1B4d is expedited, there is no assurance that [REDACTED] 25X1B4d

25X1B4d [REDACTED] collected, and therefore not timely indicators of changes in economic policy.

For these various reasons, it is apparent that excellent as is the 25X1B4d [REDACTED] military end items and certain other selected types of manufactured products, it is not adapted to the replacement of conventional research methods in estimating the production of most commodities and in the treatment of aggregate questions such as economic growth, the allocation of resources and in general, problems related to broad economic policy. It is clear that many important intelligence questions cannot be answered by numerical estimates of output of selected machinery items and the [REDACTED] 25X1B4d

Where Now?

Let us therefore not endeavor to convert the [REDACTED] 25X1B4d methodology into a universal solvent for all intelligence problems. The answer to the question, "Where now?" lies not in the extension of a method proved competent in one realm to problems to which it is obviously not adapted and for which there are more appropriate approaches. Intelligence production, moreover, is a continuing problem. The problem of the production of military end items was not solved for the present and future by collection

during the Korean war. The problem is still with us and the gaps are still numerous. Changing patterns of heavy bomber construction invite close

25X1B4d [REDACTED] analysis. The new family of post World War II ground weapons 25X1B4d offers great opportunities for [REDACTED] Relatively little has 25X1B4d been done to solve the problem of Soviet ammunition production, made complex by the multiplicity of producers. Let not the 25X1B4d experts divert their attention from these urgent problems to the collection of data on which overt information is relatively plentiful.

25X1B4d [REDACTED] analysis is also being used effectively to supplement other collection, particularly in the estimation of producer goods output. Although officially announced information on the output of Soviet machine tools for example, adequately describes total production, 25X1B4d collection and analysis has a considerable potential to fill gaps in information production of machine tools by type. The frontier of 25X1B4d analysis lies in the filling of priority gaps of this nature rather than in the ambitious effort to answer all economic intelligence questions.

It is eminently appropriate to look at the maturing 25X1B4d technique in perspective and to ask what it can do best and in which direction it should seek to develop in the future. Such an inquiry, however, should be undertaken only with full awareness of the capabilities of the 25X1B4d technique, the availability and reliability of other types of data, and the nature of the intelligence questions being considered. Only in this broader context can the 25X1B4d technique develop into a mature contributor to the intelligence community as a whole.